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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.        PREFACE 
Replenishment-at-sea has been one of the highest priority matters for the leaders of 
the United States Navy beginning in 1898 when Commodore Sohley commenced 
blockading the Spanish Fleet at Santiago in Cuba. This highly visible effort has continued 
up through the present in keeping the assigned aircraft carrier battle group at sea and 
ready to fulfill its mission in support of numerous United Nations and North American 
Treaty Organization operations including the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. 
The U. S. Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups must stay at sea for long periods of 
time and must be ready to fight at a moment's notice. They are able to do that because the 
battle groups are replenished while underway with fuel, ammunition, stores, and 
provisions from a fleet of specialized cargo ships operated by both the Navy and the 
Military Sealift Command (MSC). The two methods of underway replenishment are 
vertical replenishment (VERTREP) and connected replenishment (CONREP). In general, 
customer ships are able to receive propulsion fuel, jet fuel, and stores during CONREP. 
Customer ships are able to receive stores during VERTREP as well. The method of 
delivery via CONREP or VERTREP is usually discussed and agreed upon before the ships 
actually come alongside one another. 
In addition to the two methods of receiving material during the replenishment 
evolution, there are two methods of operating the Navy's logistics support force ships. 
The first method uses traditional Navy personnel while the second method uses civilian 
mariners (CIVMARS) who are managed by MSC. Prior to 1972, all of the Navy's combat 
logistics ships were manned and operated with active duty uniformed personnel. Over the 
last 23 years the Navy has transferred various classes of combat logistics force ships to 
the MSC. The principal reason that Navy ships have been transferred to the MSC is 
because it was thought to be less expensive because a civilian manned ship has a much 
smaller crew than one manned in the traditional Navy way. 
During the Cold War, the United States was well on its way to its stated goal of 
having a 600 ship Navy. With the demise of the former Soviet Union, the Navy has had to 
reconsider its strategy with regard to the size of its operating forces. Presently the Navy is 
committed to an operating fleet of approximately 350 combatants. In light of an ever 
present political climate in which defense dollars are being traded for domestic programs, 
the Navy's force planners continue to strive to cut spending in as many areas as possible 
while trying to meet all of the Navy's mission requirements worldwide. At the same time, 
the Navy leadership desires to preserve its force structure when defense budgets are 
constantly being raided to fund non-defense programs and the military manpower pool is 
getting smaller. 
In 1990 the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) asked the Center for 
Naval Analysis (CNA) to assess the potential cost savings of transferring combat logistics 
force (CLF) ships to the MSC to be operated by civilian crews and a small military 
detachment (MILDET). The study focused on the more quantifiable costs of operating 
CLF ships with civilian rather the military crews. These studies did not assess less 
quantifiable aspects of the transfer issue, such as crew endurance during wartime or under 
high-tempo peacetime operations. The cost to personnel in this case is difficult to 
measure. The reliability of civil service crews on ships that are placed under the 
operational control of the military is another effect of the transfer that is not easily 
measured. When men and women join the regular or reserve component of the Navy, 
there is an understanding that they may be called upon to go into a war zone and possibly 
get killed. During peacetime operations the enemy is not shooting and people tend to 
react differently in a stressful situation such as war. Another issue that was not addressed 
was that an active Naval vessel requires more personnel since it needs to operate and 
maintain all of the weapon systems which MSC ships do not have. Finally, the effect of 
this transfer on certain personnel programs such as the Women at Sea program and 
command opportunities for senior officers was not addressed. The Women at Sea 
program was brought into existence in the early 1980s to provide an avenue for qualified 
women to serve aboard Navy vessels which, until recently, was not a career path for 
women because of the statutes that did not allow women to serve on combatants. 
The Chief of Naval Operations approved the transfer of MARS class shuttle 
logistics ships in October 1990. The transfer process began in 1992 and was completed in 
March 1995. This decision was based largely on the CNA study, estimated an annual cost 
savings of $9.8 million per ship transferred. The savings would be realized primarily in the 
reduction of crew size from 446 uniformed personnel under Navy manning requirements 
to approximately 184 personnel which includes a small detachment of an estimated 35 
uniformed Navy personnel (CRM 90-130, June 1990). 
One of the most applicable reasons that was cited to explain how the MSC is to operate 
the ships with such a greatly reduced (60% less) is given in the CNA report: 
The MSC is able to operate CLF ships with much smaller crews because 
skilled mariners are hired. One reason for higher manning levels on Navy 
vessels is that unskilled recruits must constantly be trained to replace more 
skilled sailors who spend only a few years in uniform. 
(Rost, Keenan, and Nelson, 1990, p. 7). 
The transfer of the MARS class ships has been completed and the ships are 
currently undergoing extensive material handling and habitability upgrades. The upgrades 
include the installation of three 12,000 pound three pallet capacity elevators, which will 
improve the vertical lift capacity of the material handling system. This allows ship's 
personnel to fabricate and build unit loads (pallets) which is a critical path item in 
achieving the required transfer delivery rates. The habitability upgrades include removing 
the 30-80 person berthing compartments and replacing them with staterooms which 
service between one and six personnel. The USNS SAN JOSE (T-AFS-6) was one of the 
first of the class to receive the previously mentioned configuration modifications and was 
completed in February, 1995. USNS NIAGARA FALLS (T-AFS-3) is currently 
undergoing the conversion and is scheduled to return to the fleet in December, 1995. 
B.        THESIS PREVIEW 
This objective of this thesis is to weigh the benefits, advantages, and disadvantages 
of the transfer and conversion program of these ships. The overall purpose of this project 
is to make a statement as to whether or not the project has been worthwhile to date. The 
primary benefit of this study to provide an additional tool to decisions makers in the 
execution of future programs. Additionally, this study can be used to evaluate the current 
program and improve upon it. 
Chapter II provides a detailed discussion of the operational logistics environment 
in which CLF ships operate including current methodology and procedures. Chapters III 
and IV explain theoretical frameworks for making such decisions based on cost and 
performance data from the ships that have been transferred and converted. Chapter V 
concludes the thesis with a summary and offers recommendations for the program. 

II. BACKGROUND 
A.        SHIPS OF THE COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE (CLF) 
The CLF fleet consists of approximately 50 ships that carry a wide array of 
commodities ranging from the Fleet Issue Load List (FILL) which consists of 
approximately 15,000 line items of frequently used spare parts and consumables to jet 
aircraft fuel. Table 1 illustrates types of ships in the CLF and the different commodities 
that are carried onboard the different types of ships. 
Ship 
Type 




F76 JP5 AO 
D/L 
AMMO 
TAFS YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
AOE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
AOR NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
AE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
TAO NO Y/N NO NO NO YES YES YES NO 
AO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES Y/N 
Table 1. Commodities Carried by Ship Type 
Although this table shows that there are only six different types of ships in the CLF 
inventory, the types and configuration of what each ship carries in its holds varies 
substantially. These six types of ships fall into two categories: station ships and shuttle 
ships. 
B. STATION SHIPS 
Fast combat support ships (AOEs) and fleet replenishment oilers (AORs) are both 
considered station ships. The original Navy plan when building toward a 600 ship fleet 
was to have 15 aircraft carrier battle groups and one AOE or AOR to permanently travel 
with it. With the end of the Cold War and the constant pressure to decrease the Navy's 
budget, this plan has been abandoned. Station ships carry each of the three types of 
products that the Navy transfers from logistics ships to combatant ships at sea: petroleum 
products, subsistence and parts (stores), and ammunition. Both types of station ships have 
helicopter hangers and landing flight decks, since helicopters are used, along with other 
methods to ferry supplies between ships during re-supply operations. Station ships are 
also fitted with a variety of missiles, guns, and other defensive weapons. The ships were 
designed, in part, to defend themselves as well as provide some offensive firepower to aid 
the battle group. 
The existing fleet of fast combat support ships is composed of four ships of the 
Sacramento class (AOE-1). These vessels were delivered to the Navy between 1964 and 
1970. Each one of the ships displaces 53,600 tons when fully loaded. Fast combat 
support ships are capable of steaming at about 26 knots. This capability makes them a 
valuable asset to the battle group commander because the ships can keep up with the 
combatants and the battle group does not have to retreat to replenish. The ships have the 
capacity to carry approximately 177,000 barrels of petroleum products, 2,100 tons of 
ammunition, and 500 tons of stores.  Congress authorized a new class of fast combat 
support ship, AOE-6, in fiscal year 1987. The first three of the four ships of the class are: 
USS SUPPLY (AOE-6), commissioned in February 1994, USS RAINIER (AOE-7), 
commissioned in January 1995, and USS ARCTIC (AOE-8), scheduled to be 
commissioned in late 1995. AOE-10, USS BRIDGE, is under construction at the time of 
this writing. The AOE-6 class ships have capacities similar to that of the AOE-1 class. 
There are three remaining WITCHITA class fleet replenishment oilers (AOR) out 
of the original seven vessels built. These ships were delivered between 1969 and 1976 and 
are slightly smaller than the fast combat support ships. The fleet replenishment oilers 
displace 41,350 tons when fully loaded and their maximum speed is around 20 knots. 
Each ship carries about 170,000 barrels of petroleum products, 600 tons of ammunition, 
and 300 tons of stores. This class of ship also has a variety of offensive and defensive 
weapons that is similar to the AOE. 
Two critical differences distinguish fast combat support ships from the fleet 
replenishment oilers. The AOR has less than one-third of the carrying capacity for 
ammunition of the AOE class of ship (600 tons compared with 2,100 tons). In addition, 
the fleet replenishment oiler is a slower ship compared with the fast combat support ship 
(20 knots compared to 26 knots). Both of these factors could play a significant role in 
how a battle group commander executes his war plan, because he may not have as much 
flexibility with regard to his replenishment. 
C.        SHUTTLE SHIPS 
Three types of ships are included in the shuttle ship category: oilers (AOs and 
T-AOs), ammunition ships (AEs and T-AEs), and stores ships (T-AFSs). In contrast to 
the station ship concept, in which the ship carries all three general types of supplies 
(petroleum products, ammunition, and stores), the shuttle ships are designed to basically 
carry one of the three product types. In the Navy's concept of operations, the shuttle ship 
transports goods from land-based logistics depots and supply centers to the station ships, 
which in turn deliver the supplies to the battle group. The shuttle ships are also completely 
capable of transferring material to the customer directly, via connected or vertical 
replenishment.  The method of replenishment depends on the time available, the amount of 
material to be transferred, and the desires of the receiving ship's captain, although each 
UNREP is conducted under the same general guidelines. 
Currently, there are approximately 20 oilers in the Navy's inventory. There are 
three different classes of oilers ranging in displacement from 27,000 to 40,000 tons when 
fully loaded. The carrying capacity of these oilers varies between 120,000 and 180,000 
barrels of petroleum products and their maximum speed varies from 16 knots to 20 knots, 
depending on the class. 
The ammunition ships are designed to transport and transfer ammunition both to 
the customer ship that needs to re-arm as well as receiving ammunition from ships who 
have no immediate need for it, such as those ships going into an overhaul or upkeep 
status. Five SURIBACHI class ships were delivered to the Navy in the late 1950s and will 
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reach the end of their expected service life later in this decade. Eight KELAUEA class 
ships were delivered to the Navy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The ship's full load 
displacements are about 17,500 tons (SURIBACHI class) and 20,000 tons (KILAUEA 
class). Each ship carriers up to 6,500 tons of ammunition and the maximum speed is 
around 20 knots for both classes of ship. 
There are eight of the original ten stores ships remaining in the CLF inventory. Of 
those the ships, seven are of the MARS class (AFS-1 thru AFS-7). The final three stores 
ships (AFS-8 thru AFS-10) were purchased from Great Britain. These vessels, also 
known as "Brit Boats," displace about 16,500 tons when fully loaded and their maximum 
speed is approximately 20 knots. 
D.        MARS CLASS STORES SHIPS 
The MARS class combat stores ships were designed in the late 1950s and 
constructed by National Steel and Shipbuilding Company. The ships were commissioned 
between 1963 and 1970. All ships were originally designed with accommodations for 37 
officers, 441 enlisted personnel, and six transient personnel for a total of 484. 
Ship manning was sized and the cargo handling systems were designed to provide 
cargo breakout rates to sustain maximum connected replenishment transfer rates to an 
aircraft carrier to port and destroyer/frigate to starboard. Additionally, the maximum 
transfer rate included material transfer to a more distant customer ship via vertical 
replenishment. To support these high material transfer rates, numerous package 
conveyors, pallet conveyors, and elevators were installed to efficiently move cargo and 
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Stores from various hold locations to its CONREP or VERTREP station for further 
delivery to the customer ship. Table 2 shows a representative stowage arrangement for 
HOLD NUMBER 
LEVEL 1 2 3 4 5 
2 FILL DRY CHILL HULL FILL 
J FILL DRY FREEZE HULL FILL 
4 FILL DRY FREEZE HULL FILL 
5 HAZMAT CHILL Ship's Store 
Table 2. Typical Commodity Location for T-AFSs 
FILL (Fleet Issue Load List) material, HULL (High Usage Load List) material, and 
HAZMAT (Hazardous Material) broken down by hold and level for ships of the class. It 
is important to keep in mind that this is only a representative stowage plan and that over 
time modifications are incorporated into the original design. 
While the original cargo handling design concept was intended to preclude the 
need for staging the cargo to be delivered, operational problems were experienced with 
the conveyors, and even with the appropriate personnel manned and ready, pre-staging 
pallets of materials in advance of meeting up with the customer ship was usually required. 
For example, the order of replenishment could change at the last minute. If the AFS is 
told that ship X is the first in line, their material is pre-staged closest to the flight deck or 
CONREP station. If the order changes after the material is pre-staged, then all of those 
pallets must be moved around in order to accommodate the new order. 
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MSC conducted a study to determine the actual cargo transfer rates for the pre- 
modification configuration of the AFS class of ships. The transfer rate is the key element 
in developing the new cargo handling arrangement based upon the fact that MSC mans its 
ships at a level that is smaller than the Navy's level. The number of pallets to be 
transferred drives the number of billets that are allowed on board the ship. The study 
concluded that the cargo transfer operation was significantly burdened by the existing 
arrangement of equipment which could only carry as many boxes or pallets as the cargo 
handlers could place on rotating trays. This resulted in package trays that were sent up to 
the main deck half empty because the handlers could not keep up with the speed of the 
conveyor equipment. Because of this, the actual transfer rate was approximately 50% of 
the system design rate (Procurement Management Plan, 1992). Table 3 illustrates the 
material handling configuration after the modifications and upgrade to T-AFS-7, USNS 
SAN JOSE. It is important to keep in mind that although all of the MARS class ships 
have been transferred to MSC, the range of modifications and habitability upgrades that 
each ship will finally receive will be somewhat different due to budget and other 
constraints. For example, the USNS NIAGARA FALLS (T-AFS-3) is not receiving any 
upgrades or modifications to Hold #1 and the elevators which service Holds 3 and 4 are 
rated at a capacity of 10,000 lbs. 
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Elevator Nbr Hold/Location Weight/Capacity Unit Load Decks Served 
1 Hold #1/Aft 3,000 lbs 1 Pallet 4 
2 Hold #2/Aft 3,000 lbs 1 Pallet 5 
3 Hold #3/Fwd 12,000 lbs 3 Pallets 5 
4 Hold #4/Aft 12,000 lbs 3 Pallets 4 
5 Hold #5/Fwd 12,000 lbs 3 Pallets 3 
Table 3. New Elevator Configuration for T-AFS-7 
One of MSC's primary goals during the conversion is to return each ship to fleet 
support services on schedule and in a fully mission ready status which translates into 
improved customer service for the underway battle group.  The final impact of the newly 
installed material handling equipment and the reduced manning in crew size is only now 
being seen as the ships have begun to return to service. 
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III. CARGO HANDLING AND PROGRAM CONVERSION 
A.        OVERVIEW 
During a casual observation of an aircraft carrier battle group UNREP, an 
inexperienced or unseasoned observer may get the idea that the evolution is rather 
simplistic. On the contrary, nothing could be further from the truth. The actual transfer of 
one pallet of material, stores, or personnel from one ship to another is the culmination of a 
process that usually begins up to one month prior to the actual UNREP. 
The difficulty in evaluating an ongoing program or simulated cargo handling plan 
that has been developed for a very wide range of scenarios lies in the fact that each ship 
and crew has determined its own best way to properly prepare for and conduct an 
UNREP. One such strategy that has been developed to conduct an UNREP is where the 
T-AFS crew breaks out as much material as is requested and stages it near the CONREP 
station several days before the replenishment. These strategies are based largely on the 
corporate knowledge of the ship's key personnel and the training process they receive 
during Refresher Training (REFTRA) or during inport and at-sea Ship Qualification Trials 
(SQT). Cargo handling plans and procedures have therefore evolved into the final product 
by way of an iterative process which is predominantly based on learning experience. At 
the time of this research, there is no concrete tool specifically designed to aid in planning 
for cargo handling operations. Navy Publication NWP-14 (Replenishment-at-Sea) is a 
mandatory shipboard manual and it is used as a tool that provides a listing of the general 
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capabilities of UNREP equipment and detailed operating instructions for major pieces of 
UNREP equipment. NWP-14 does not, however, provide specific guidance and 
procedures for the conduct of an UNREP evolution. This publication does provide 
specific information with regard to expected transfer rates of the available equipment 
onboard various classes of ships. This information, along with descriptions of the various 
environmental conditions that have been experienced are useful in providing expected 
results of an UNREP. There are many environmental conditions that are major 
contributors to the length of time and the overall success of an UNREP. Five key factors 
that are known to impact underway replenishment operations are: 
1. crew size of both the transferring and receiving ships 
2. the number and type of receiving ships 
3. sea state and the distance between the ships 
4. number of pallets and commodity breakdown of those pallets 
5. material condition of transfer equipment which includes fixed equipment 
such as winches and helicopters (prime movers) 
This list focuses on the external movement of the material and is of little assistance when 
planning the material movement onboard a CLF ship.  This is because the material 
movement that the CLF crew does before the UNREP begins is just as important if not 
more so. There is not a hard and fast way or "laundry check list" for the conduct of an 
UNREP. Neither is there a way to judge the success or failure of an UNREP. 
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B.        PROCEDURES 
The planning of an UNREP takes place on board both the receiving and 
transferring ship, but for our purposes we will concentrate on only the receiving vessel. 
Typically, a T-AFS does not provide service to its customers on an individual basis. The 
T-AFS is usually scheduled to replenish the entire battle group or sub-sections of it all at 
one time which usually takes most of a day. This is not always the case; an emergent 
replenishment may have to be conducted because of some unforeseen contingency such as 
a ship having to break off from the main battle group to conduct an exercise. This ship 
may not be able to replenish with the battle group and is scheduled by itself. Customer 
service is the main goal of MSC and they are extremely flexible in getting material and 
stores to the customer whenever and wherever it is needed. These scheduled and 
unscheduled replenishments are called "hits" and are scheduled by the Commander, 
Logistics Group, Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC). The schedule is usually 
promulgated with specific instructions on how and when to requisition material. 
An UNREP cycle usually begins 21-30 days in advance of the actual transfer of 
material. It is important to remember that all of these procedures are only guidelines and 
each replenishment evolution, also known as a "hit", is different. For example, prior to a 
deployment, all of the battle group supply officers will meet with the T-AFS to discuss 
unique procedures that may apply to this deployment. These meetings also serve to allow 
all parties to get to know one another so that a smooth working relationship can be 
developed and maintained. A typical flow of events are listed below. The times following 
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each step represent the time it takes to perform the step and are only estimates based on 
T-AFS personnel experience. 
1. Requirements list received by T-AFS, usually by Naval message. The 
customer ship is continually in the process of developing requirements lists. 
2. Customer lists are processed by T-AFS stock control personnel, if material 
is in stock or not in stock.  (2-6 hours ) 
3 Each list is broken down by hold number and level where material is 
located for each customer. (2-6 hours) 
4. Lists are given to T-AFS cargo personnel (CIVMARS). (1-2 hours) 
5. Material is broken out and palletized by ship in order of replenishment. (1-7 
days) 
6. 100% of material is checked to ensure the correct material is going to the 
correct ship. (1-7 days) 
7. Dry material/stores are brought to the main deck and positioned near the 
transfer point (flight deck for VERTREP/RAS station for CONREP). 
Fresh fruit, vegetables, and frozen remain in the reefer hold until just before 
replenishment to prevent spoilage. Pallets are built in the hold. (1-7 days) 
8. Ships form up to begin the UNREP in the order that the battle group 
commander determines based on input from all parties. (12-48 hours) 
The steps that we present in the above list are only one example of the evolution. Each 
T-AFS master has his/her own special experiences that are incorporated into the final 
product that make each UNREP evolution unique. Some of the steps listed could be 
performed concurrently to save time. For example, the checking of the material break 
outs can be checked before the all of the breakouts have been completed. The officer-in- 
charge of the military detachment, who is a Navy Supply Corps commander, works very 
closely with the master of the vessel as well as his counterpart in the CIVMAR crew. 
Both groups have to be intimately aware of how the other operates in order for the whole 
evolution to work well. To date this relationship has been very good. Prior to the transfer 
of these ships, all uniformed personnel onboard Naval vessels served under a line 
commanding officer. The potential for friction in changing the reporting senior from a 
military person to a civilian master was great. However, this did not happen and the spirit 
of cooperation that exists between the uniformed personnel and the civilian mariners is 
evident in all phases of logistics support. 
C.        UNREP EVOLUTION AS A SYSTEM 
A successful UNREP is the integration of numerous parts that must work in 
complete concert in order for the overall goal to be achieved. With respect to cost, the 
two most important are the people/labor portion and the machinery portion. The people 
portion consists of uniformed and civilian personnel both ashore and afloat that do the 
planning, organizing, and execution of the UNREP. The machinery portion of the system 
consists of the forklifts, elevators and other material handling equipment that allow 
personnel to move hundreds of pallets of material during a single UNREP. 
The transfer of the MARS class ships to MSC focused on two major areas. The 
first was personnel and its associated savings to the Department of Defense. The second 
area was the upgrades to the material handling system, specifically the addition of 12,000 
lb, three pallet elevators to assist and increase the vertical lift capability of the vessels. 
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In order to make a statement as to the success of the program, these two areas will be 
discussed in greater detail. 
D. MANNING BEFORE AND AFTER TRANSFER 
In almost all organizations that exist today the greatest costs are usually those 
associated with labor. For example, approximately 35% of the Navy's annual budget each 
year is spent on personnel costs to include pay and allowances, retirement, and other 
benefits. Active duty Naval vessels are manned based on scenarios that would occur 
during wartime, not the functional mission of the ship. In addition to the professional 
duties that a uniformed personnel performs related to their rates, many personnel are also 
assigned collateral duties. For example, a Navy electrician spends a good deal of his time 
working on shipboard electrical systems, as well as performing planned and corrective 
maintenance on any number of electrical systems on board ship. He may also be assigned 
a very critical duty such as being a member of an inport or underway firefighting team.  An 
example of a collateral duty which is not nearly so critical, but no less important is being a 
member of the menu review board.  Table 4 lists the number of billets before and after the 
transfer to MSC. The actual number of personnel assigned to each ship may vary slightly. 
Before After Eliminated Total Savings 
457 38 419 S17.3M 
Table 4. Change in Personnel Billets (Rost, Keenan, Nelson, 1990) 
The predominantly Navy crews are being replaced by civilian mariners. In addition 
to the extra manning that is to complete the required military taskings, the higher Navy 
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manning can be attributed to the fact that unskilled personnel are hired and must be 
constantly trained to replace those who leave the service or are transferred. Civilian 
mariners tend to stay in MSC for longer periods. Another possible explanation of the 
increased manning levels is that the goal of the Navy personnel chiefs is to man ships and 
squadrons at a level that is required for conditions that are found in battle. Table 5 
represents the number of civilian billets added and the cost associated with the transfer and 
conversion of the vessels. There is an $11.3 million potential personnel cost savings as a 
result of the transfer. 
Before Transfer After Transfer Annual Cost 
Nbr of Civilian Personnel 0 135 $6.0 M 
Table 5. Additional Billets. (Rost, Keenan, Nelson, 1990) 
E.        EQUIPMENT BEFORE AND AFTER TRANSFER 
The second major portion of the conversion and transfer program is the major 
upgrade to the material handling capabilities of the ships. This included various elevator 
installations and habitability upgrades. The habitability upgrades that are taking place are 
mostly in the form of rearranging and reconfiguring the berthing areas. On board Navy 
vessels, enlisted personnel occupy berthing compartments which are capable of holding 
between 20 and 100 personnel depending on the type of vessel. MSC personnel are 
authorized more private living and berthing conditions which include one and two person 
staterooms. 
21 
There are also plans to keep at least one of the larger berthing compartments intact so it 
may be used for transient personnel that the T-AFS may be required to shuttle to and from 
the battle group. 
The other half of the material portion of this program is the installation of various 
elevators on board the ships. Each ship is being converted by a variety of contractors and 
subcontractors at various shipyards throughout the country. Table 6 summarizes the 
estimated changes that have been scheduled. 
Ship Cost Est Work Scheduled Returns to Service 
MARS (TAFS-1) $20M 2-12 K Elevators TBD 
NIAGARA FALLS (TAFS-3) $25M 2-12 K Elevators Oct95 
CONCORD (TAFS-5) $32M 2-12 K Elevators Feb96 
SAN DIEGO (TAFS-6) $30M 3-12 K Elevators Sept 96 
SAN JOSE (TAFS-7) $24M 3-12K/2-3K Complete 
Table 6. Planned Equipment and Habitability Modifications 
It is worthwhile to mention at this point that the order in which the ships are going 
into the availability is not the order in which they were commissioned.  The availability 
schedule was based on the fleet requirements and the point in the maintenance cycle where 
each ship was at the time. This mammoth project has been in the planning stages since the 
mid 1980s. Although only one ship, USNS SAN JOSE, has been completed and returned 
to service for a relatively short period of time (April 95), we can now look at some of the 
results of the program and make assessments as to the degree of success as well as make 
recommendations with regard to the program in general. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM 
A. OVERVIEW 
MSC has seven primary goals for the AFS transfer program. The seven goals are: 
1. Complete a comprehensive and orderly life-cycle manager turnover with the 
NAVSEA Ship Logistics Manager (SLM), Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (Planning 
Yard), and COMNAVSURFPAC/LANT. 
2. Complete a comprehensive and orderly logistics turnover with NAVSEA 04, 
NAVSUP, NAVSEACENPAC, and SPCC. 
3. Complete a comprehensive and orderly turnover of each ship with the 
COMNAVSURFLANT/PAC designated commanders. 
4. Complete a logistics review of each ship ensuring that an accurate configuration 
baseline as well as associated repair part, technical manual, and engineering 
drawing support is provided. 
5. Reconcile and purify the AFS Fleet Issue Load List (FILL) material. 
6. Complete each ship's turnover CIVMOD availability on time and within 
budget. 
7. Return each ship to fleet support services on schedule and in a fully mission 
ready status. (Procurement Management Plan, 1992) 
This chapter will critique the implementation of the program. The analysis is broken down 
into personnel issues and equipment issues. 
B. PERSONNEL 
The data on pay and allowances that were available from Hildebrand (1993), 
clearly show that from a labor cost perspective, this program has been and most likely will 
continue to be a tremendous success. There will be a substantial savings in the associated 
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training as well.  The most important advantage to the taxpayer is that fewer tax dollars 
will have to be spent on personnel wages when a ship is transferred from the Navy to 
MSC. 
This labor savings does not come without a price. There are several possible 
affects that relate to the personnel issue as a result of the transfer of these vessels. First of 
all, when these billets are eliminated the personnel assigned to those billets may have a 
difficult time finding an assignment that is both beneficial to their personal desires as well 
as being good for the Navy. This affect is a short-term disadvantage because a billet can 
be dissolved relatively quickly but the body that held that billet will still be under an 
enlistment or officer contract for two to four years.  The practice in the past has been to 
overstaff various commands until the normal attrition process brings the overall number of 
personnel back in sync with the number of billets available.  This creates shortages at one 
command and excesses at another command which takes time to smooth out. 
The second disadvantage is that while the ships belonged to the Navy, the 
Commanding Officers of those ships were prospective aircraft carrier commanding officers 
using the AFS as an opportunity to take command of a deep draft vessel. This tour 
allowed the captain to gain valuable experience prior to becoming an aircraft carrier 
commanding officer.  Since those AFS billets are now gone, there are fewer deep draft 
ships available for almost the same number of available and eligible captains that are in the 
Navy. For example, if there were ten available billets and ten available and qualified 
officers and now there are only eight available billets the competition has just increase for 
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a smaller number of billets. In this case, the issue is whether or not the Navy can provide 
a viable career path for prospective commanding officers. Again, these are short-term 
affects that will work themselves out as the Navy continues to "rightsize" through the 
remainder of the decade. 
The third disadvantage relates to the level of combat readiness that has been given 
up as a result of the transfer of the MARS class ships. The main thrust of the data that has 
been collected and analyzed by both the Navy and MSC is mostly related to the traditional 
"bean counting". Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., of the American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research said the following (Hildebrand 1993): 
From the Navy's point of view, shifting some underway 
replenishment responsibility to MSC is a trade-off between dollar savings 
and combat readiness. With the Navy budget under increasing pressure; 
dollar savings have been favored. Navy officials, however, do not intend to 
shift the entire mission to MSC. In fact, many senior naval officers are 
concerned about the number of transfers that have already taken place. 
They fear that the savings obtained at the sacrifice of combat efficiency 
may prove to be a false economy in the long run, particularly in a wartime 
environment. 
As previously mentioned, any existing self-defense armaments are removed when 
Navy logistics ships are transferred to MSC. In peacetime, operating logistics platforms 
through MSC has been more than satisfactory. For example, MSC ships played a key role 
in supporting the fleet in the Middle East during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. 
(Hildebrand 1993) Although Desert Storm was considered a war by most analysts, the 
logistics efforts were conducted with virtually no opposition. We feel that the Navy could 
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rely on civilians during wartime if the logistics effort were opposed and the risk of being 
shot at were high. The men and women of both MSC and the Navy are of the highest 
caliber and although most have not been tested in battle, we feel their performance in 
those situations would be outstanding. 
C.        GENERAL EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE 
One of the methods that the Navy and MSC uses to measure and manage the 
readiness of their operational vessels is Casualty Reports (CASREPS). These reports are 
sent from the Commanding Officer/Master of the ship to various commands in and out of 
the ship's chain of command. A CASREP is sent when a piece of equipment fails and 
cannot be repaired by ship's force with on board repair parts within a reasonable amount 
of time, or when that equipment needs technical assistance that ship's force personnel 
cannot provide.  The purpose of this message is to inform all concerned that a ship has 
some kind of a problem and its operational capability has been reduced.  This information 
helps the battle group commander plan and conduct operations. Although all CASREPs 
are closely managed at all times, the management is increased to a higher level during a 
wartime scenario. The information contained in the remarks section of a CASREP 
message tells the battle group commander that one of his ships is unable to perform one or 
more of its assigned missions which in turn may force the battle plans to be altered. 
There are three broad categories of CASREPS that are currently used by the 
Navy's surface fleet. A brief description of each follows: 
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1. C-2:     A deficiency exists in a mission equipment which causes a minor 
degradation in any primary mission, or a major degradation of a secondary 
equipment/mission. 
2. C-3:     A deficiency exists in a mission essential equipment which causes a 
major degradation but no the total loss of a primary equipment/mission. 
3. C-4:     A deficiency exists in a missin essential equipment that is worse 
than casualty category 3, and causes a loss of at least one primary mission. 
The assignment of the CASREP category is the responsibility of the Commanding 
Officer/Master of the ship. Advice and recommendations are solicited from the 
department head who actually owns the equipment. There is some subjectivity involved in 
the assignment of the CASREP category. What is viewed as "C-3" by one skipper may be 
seen as "C-2" by another. Most of this subjectivity is found in the assignment of CASREP 
categories for equipments and missions in the secondary area. There is rarely any 
discussion as to what the list of equipments and missions are that are directly related to the 
primary mission of a ship. For example, the inability of an aircraft carrier commanding 
officer to be able to launch aircraft because its catapults have failed is definitely in the 
"C-4" category.  On the other hand, if a galley oven is down, a "C-2" category is assigned. 
The successful operation of the ship's galley is important, but a priority system is in place 
to assist the captain in the proper assignment of CASREP categories. This priority system 
is in place to ensure that the proper level of attention is directed to the proper shipboard 
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equipment.  The philosophy of the captain plays a substantial role in the determination of 
CASREP categories. 
CASREP data for all ships, MSC as well as Navy, is collected and analyzed at the 
Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) in Mechanicsburg, PA. This data is tracked and 
analyzed by civilian and military specialists who try to determine how to decrease the 
number of CASREPS fleet-wide. For example, if one ship of a class is sending in an 
inordinate number of reports, questions are asked about maintenance practices, 
operational scheduling, manning levels, etc. Another example would be the same weapon 
system or component failing on many different platforms. This scenario would cause the 
specialists at SPCC to look at the engineering design, repair part support, or a host of 
other factors to try to determine why that particular system is failing at a higher than 
expected level. Presumably, a decrease in CASREPS can be equated with an increase in 
fleet operational readiness. This point has been hotly contested for some time and is 
beyond the scope of this research. Table 7 is a summary of all reported CASREPS from 
AFS/TAFS ships from the period January 1989 to September 1995. A detailed 
breakdown per ship can be seen in Appendix D. 
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CASREP Category 
Year # of ships 2 3 4 Total Ave/Month Ave/Month/Ship 
1989 8 306 24 5 335 28 3.5 
1990 8 361 47 21 429 36 4.5 
1991 8 270 17 8 295 25 3.1 
1992 8 275 32 14 321 27 3.4 
1993 8 302 29 11 342 29 3.6 
1994 7 227 20 10 257 19 2.7 
1995 7 144 8 7 159 12 1.7 
Table 7. CASREPS reported by AFS/T-AFS 
Taken by itself, the average number of reports submitted between 1989 and 1993 
does not suggest anything concrete. Note that the total number of CASREPS does not 
make any distinction between those that require parts and those that require technical 
assistance. However, beginning in 1994 the average number CASREPS drops 
significantly. 
Although the CNO approved the transfer of the MARS class ships in October of 
1990, the process had only just begun. The upgrades to the habitability and material 
handling equipment had to be contracted for and implemented, as well as many other 
administrative details which had to be worked out. The actual availability period of each 
ship transferred from the Navy to MSC began in 1994. Before a ship goes into the 
conversion process there is normally a period of two or three months called a stand down 
during which the crew of the ship get ready for the transfer. Therefore, most of the 
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equipment is not running and it generally does not breakdown. The potential for a casualty 
to occur in this period decreases substantially. During 1994 and 1995 the ships have been 
scheduled for the upgrades, and since they are not in service, the number of casualty 
reports has decreased. Another reason for the significant decrease is when the ships were 
transferred to MSC some of the Navy specific equipment and all of the weapon systems 
were removed. This means that the universe of equipments that could breakdown 
decreased. Finally, the decrease in reported casualties could be attributed to the fact that 
civilian masters command the ships instead of Navy captains. Because their backgrounds 
are generally different, their philosophies on reporting problems to their respective seniors 
may be different. 
The maintenance philosophies of the Navy and MSC are somewhat different as 
well. The Navy has a well documented and established program of preventitive 
maintenance that at times literally forces management to perform scheduled maintenance. 
The operating tempo of Navy ships is sometimes so fierce that equipment is often pushed 
to its physical limits to find out when it will fail because in a battle situation, the captain 
must be aware of the upperbounds of his ship, equipment, and weapon systems. The 
punishment that Navy vessels take could account for the higher number of CASREPS 
reported until the ships were transferred to MSC. When the ships belonged to the Navy, 
they had a secondary warfighting mission. On the other hand, MSC does not expect to 
take its ships into battle and they tend to take a more evenhanded approach to equipment 
maintenance. All of the maintenance does indeed get performed, but the harsh and 
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sometimes erratic operating conditions are not experienced by MSC which in turn could 
result in fewer equipment failures. 
D.        MATERIAL MOVEMENT TO CUSTOMERS 
The overall mission of a T-AFS is to deliver subsistence and stores to the ships of 
an aircraft carrier battle group. The ship can also function as a personnel transfer platform 
as well as a shuttle service, bringing cargo and material from an ashore supply activity or 
depot to the fleet. The transfer and conversion process of the MARS class of ships is only 
partially complete and only one ship, USNS SAN JOSE has been completed and returned 
to service. SAN JOSE completed the conversion process with the installation of the new 
material handling system and habitability improvements and has been operating since in its 
new configuration was completed in February, 1995. 
The ships of the CLF community produce a periodic report referred to as a 
Subsistence Transaction Report (STR). This management tool lists, by category, the 
types of commodities (chill, freeze, dry) that have been transferred to its customer ships. 
These reports are in the form of Naval messages which are transmitted to other CLF units 
that are operating in the same geographic area. These reports are also sent to 
COMLOGWESTPAC who is responsible for the overall scheduling of the TAFS ships. 
Since returning to service in March 1995, SAN JOSE has submitted 21 reports covering 
the period March through September 1995. Each report covers approximately 10 days, 
and reports are submitted as significant material transfers occur, not based on the passage 
of time. 
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Table 8 summarizes the average amount of material in tons that has been transferred by 
SAN JOSE to its customers since March 1995 per STR cycle. 
Chill Frozen Dry Total 
7 Tons 27 Tons 42 Tons 76 Tons 
Table 8. Average Subsistence Transferred per STR period 
Taken by itself, this information only reveals how much material has been 
transferred with the new configuration. However, interviews with MSC and MELDET 
personnel indicate that the amount of material transferred before the transfer is comparable 
to the amount transferred while the ships were manned totally by Navy personnel. 
(Roberts, 1995) This lends credence to the fact that the changeover has been relatively 
invisible to the customer. This was one of MSC s primary goals when undertaking this 
project. 
Another interpretation of this data is that the amount of material transferred is a 
function of the total amount of material requested by the customer ships. Underway ships 
are not forced to requisition material and supplies from the T-AFS. They can wait and 
order material from a supporting supply activity where the ship may be pulling into port 
for a visit. The ship may experience the situation where they do not need any material 
from the T-AFS although this is very unlikely. 
E. SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
A simulation model is a representation of a process or system that over time uses 
generated data to simulate the operation of the real system. The model is based on 
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assumptions about the real system that are expressed as relationships between entities, 
objects of interest, which in this case are the pallets of material.  After the SAN JOSE had 
completed the modification process, the officers and crew faced the significant challenge 
of operating a brand new system without the advantages of reviewing or testing reliable 
preliminary estimates of the new equipment and what effect the new configuration would 
have on the operation of the entire ship. 
1. Review of previous study 
An initial study (Fabish, 1994) was conducted to enable the ship to avoid a long 
and potentially painful learning experience which normally happens with new equipment 
and other systems. The study used a commercially available computer software 
simulation package to analyze the material handling system on board the SAN JOSE. The 
internal cargo handling features considered in this study were divided into two subsystems. 
The first involved the vertical movement of cargo from the holds to the main deck via the 
newly installed elevators.  Once on the main deck, the material must be moved to 
designated RAS stations or other specified staging areas. The second subsystem looked at 
the delivery of material by forklift along the main deck. 
2. Conclusions 
The model was run over a variety of scenarios that included varying the number of 
forklifts, increasing and decreasing the speed of the elevator, and varying the time required 
to place and remove a pallet from the elevator platform. The study concluded that the 
overall success of the UNREP evolution is heavily dependent on the crew assigning two 
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forklift trucks the job of removing pallets of material from the elevator platform and 
delivering them to the aftcargo staging area. From there the pallets are brought to the 
flight deck via another elevator. In addition, this study concluded that the narrow aisle 
that was created as a result of the elevator installation would require an increased level of 
coordination. Before the elevator installation two forktrucks could operate in the area 
whereas now only a single truck could operate in the narrow aisle. This conflict has been 
resolved by assigning a crewmember to act as a "traffic cop" to direct forktrucks in the 
area to prevent accidents and other unnecessary backlogs. 
F. VALIDATION 
To determine the realism of the computer simulation, interviews were conducted 
with shipboard personnel to compare the results of the various simulations with the actual 
performance of the new system. (Zagrocki, 1995) The interviews revealed that the forklift 
utilization was very close to what the initial study estimates provided. Although 
interviews can be somewhat subjective, MSC has no other formal process by which to 
judge to accuracy of this study. For example, it is hard to time the movement of pallets 
from the cargo holds to its final destination and that data was unable to be collected for 
this study.   In addition, the study suggested that the new elevators would only be utilized 
approximately 35 percent when in fact the elevators are used almost constantly during the 
first half of the UNREP and then idle after bringing all of the material to the main deck. 
This happens because the freeze and chill cargo must stay in the refrigerated holds until 
just before delivery to the customer ship.  Shipboard personnel stated that using two 
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forktrucks, as was suggested by the initial study, significantly reduced the backlog to the 
point of being a non-factor in the overall UNREP evolution. 
G.        FLIGHT DECK OPERATIONS 
Most ships prefer VERTREP instead of CONREP when receiving material while 
at sea. When the receiving ship is not connected to the supply ship the captain of the 
receiving ship is afforded a great deal of increased flexibility. This research expands on 
Fabish's original model by adding the flight deck and its associated staging areas. The 
model was run over a variety of scenarios and it was found that the length of time to 
complete the entire evolution only increased by the amount of time that was required to 
bring the pallets up from the aftcargo staging area to the flight deck. This result was 
expected. A backlog of pallets could not be created on the flight deck because of the 
limitations of the software. In other words, as soon as a pallet was brought to the flight 
deck, it was immediately picked up by a helicopter. The average time to complete the 
entire UNREP with the addition of the flight deck was 99.029 minutes. In addition, the 
average main deck utilization rate was 15 % which seemed somewhat low to those who 
were interviewed for this study. One possible explanation for this seemingly low 
utilization could lie in the limitations of the software that was used to perform the original 
simulation, which allowed a maximum of only 150 entities or pallets. In any UNREP that 
is conducted with three or more ships, at least 300 pallets of material are transferred 
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In the case of an UNREP involving an aircraft carrier, the number of pallets transferred 
can easily exceed 700 and the scenario with an aircraft carrier was not attempted. We 
feel, however, that even with these limitations, the results are valid. A sample of the 
output results can be seen in Appendix C.  Table 9 summarizes the results of the addition 
of flight deck to the simulation model. 
Scenario Total Time Main Deck 
Utilization 
1 Helicopter/1 Forktruck 101 minutes 15% 
1 Helicopter/2 Forktrucks 100 minutes 15% 
2 Helicopters/1 Forktruck 98 minutes 16% 
2 Helicopters/2 Forktrucks 97 minutes 16% 
3 Helicopters/1 Forktruck 95 minutes 17% 
3 Helicopters/2 Forktrucks 94 minutes 17% 
Table 9. Summary of Simulation Results 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
In this thesis we analyze the transfer and conversion program of the MARS class 
combat stores ships to MSC. The objectives, advantages, and disadvantages are discussed 
and an attempt is made to make an overall statement regarding the program. Chapter II 
provides a detailed discussion of the operational environment in which CLF ships operate 
including current methodology and procedures. Chapter III discusses personnel and 
equipment configurations before and after the transfer. Chapter IV analyzed equipment 
performance of the new elevator configuration to date and also provided an extension of a 
previously written computer simulation model where a flight deck is added to the overall 
material handling system. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Personnel 
This program was originally conceived so that the Department of Defense could 
save approximately $9.8 million per year per ship transferred. This savings is primarily 
achieved as a result of the reduction in crew size. There are, however, costs to personnel 
that are difficult to quantify. For example, many qualified and outstanding Navy captains 
may not have the opportunity to serve as commanding officers simply because there are 
not enough billets to go around. 
37 
Although the crews of these ships are now mostly civilian, there has been no change in 
perceived customer service to the operational battle groups.  This was one of MSC's most 
important goals while working on this project. 
2. Equipment 
The new elevator and material handling equipment that has been installed on board 
USNS SAN JOSE has performed almost flawlessly since the ship returned to service in 
March 1995. To date, only routine, normal maintenance has been performed on the 
equipment and although this is a good sign, the real test will be to chart the maintenance 
history of the equipment as it begins to age.   This additional information can then be used 
to further improve material handling capabilities.   The new equipment has made the entire 
UNREP evolution much quicker and personnel have had to learn to think quicker on their 
feet than before. Previously, only one pallet at a time was coming up from the refrigerated 
holds and now they are coming up three at a time which greatly reduces the time to make 
a decision about where they need to go next before the next group of three pallets is sent 
from the holds. Although the small backlog of pallets waiting to be moved from the 
elevator staging area to the after cargo staging is annoying, it will always be present 
because of the increased vertical lift capability of the new elevators. We conclude here 
that the choice of equipment, installation, training, and operation was done with the 
highest standards and is being maintained and operated by outstanding personnel. 
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C. Flight Deck 
The addition of the flight deck to the simualtion model only offered a slight 
decrease in the total time required to conduct the UNREP given the limitations of the 
software. The conclusion here is that the installation of the new elevator and other 
material handling equipment coupled with the existing flight deck capabilities has provided 
an improved material delivery system that is able to deliver palletized material to the battle 
group safely and at the least cost. 
The major asset of the T-AFS flight deck is its helicopters. Most T-AFS ships 
deploy with an embarked helicopter squadron which has two CH-46 type helicopters. 
Almost all of the ships in the Navy's battle groups have a helicopter squadron on board 
when they deploy. This single helicopter can be used to retrieve material instead of the 
customer ship having to wait for their pallets to be delivered. This allows both the master 
of the T-AFS and the commanding officer of the Navy ship a greater degree of flexibility 
which is always welcome. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The transfer program is approximately 40% complete with two of the five ships 
(USNS SAN JOSE and USNS NIAGARA FALLS) now returned to the fleet. As the 
program continues to mature, additional historical maintenance data will become available. 
Additional analysis can be conducted on this new data and the long-term performance of 
the new material handling system can be assessed. 
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This, along with additional feedback from the operational commanders and afloat 
personnel, will allow the overall program to be assessed and more accurately shaped to 
meet an ever changing financial and political environment. 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
CASREP Casualty Report 
CIVMARS Civilian Mariners 
CLF Combat Logistics Force 
CNA Center for Naval Analysis 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
CONREP Connected Replenishment 
MILDET Military Detachment/Department 
MSC Military Sealift Command 
NWP Naval Warfare Publication 
RAS Replenishment at Sea 
REFTRA Refresher Training 
USNS United States Naval Ship 
VERTREP Vertical Replenishment 
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APPENDIX B. SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR DEPLOYED UNITS 
SHIP FILL HULL SUB FFV/D SS F76 JP5 L/O AOD/L AMMO SODA 
TAFS-1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 
TAFS-3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 
TAFS-5 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 
TAFS-6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 
TAFS-7 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 
TAFS-8 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 
TAFS-9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 
TAFS-10 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y 
AOE-1 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
AOE-2 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
AOE-3 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
AOE-4 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
AOE-6 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
AOR-4 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
AOR-6 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
AOR-7 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y 
AE-21 N N N N N N N N N Y N 
AE-22 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-23 N N N N N N N N N Y N 
AE-24 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-25 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-27 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-28 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-29 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-32 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-33 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-34 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
AE-35 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
TAE-26 N N N N N Y N N N Y N 
TAO-146 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
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TAO-187 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAO-188 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAO-189 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAG-190 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAO-193 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAO-194 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAO-195 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAO-196 N Y N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAO-197 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
TAO-198 N Y N N N Y Y V Y N Y 
AO-177 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
AO-178 N    ' N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y 
AO-179 N N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y 
AO-180 N N N N N Y Y Y Y N Y 
AO-186 N N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y 
Source: NAVSUP Pub P-4998, Consolidated Afloat Requisitioning Guide Overseas 
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APPENDIX C. SIMAN PROGRAM ADAPTATION 
A.        MODEL CODE 
This computer simulation program simulates material movement from the cargo 
holds to the flight deck. 
BEGIN; Kelly J. Grosskopf, 1 December 1995 
startup ASSIGN: ns=Origin:   lassigns seqence number 
M=Origin:                   lassigns initial station 




multilift QUEUE,GroupQ;       for Multi load embelishment 
GROUP :Grqty; 
picklift BRANCH, 1: 
IF,Origin.LT.5,getlift3: 
IF,Origin.LT. 10,getlift4; 
getlift3 QUEUE, Lift3Q;        Sequence to rqst Lift3 
REQUEST:Lift3; 
TRANSPORT: Lift3,SEQ,100; 
getlift4 QUEUE, Lift4Q;        Sequence to rqst Lift4 
REQUEST:Lift4; 
TRANSPORT: Lift4,SEQ,10; 




TRANSPORT: Lift3,SEQ,100; Sends lift onward from hold 
sendlifM DELAY:ED(13); 
TRANSPORT: Lift4,SEQ,100; Sends lift onward from hold 
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STATION, 1-8;                      HOLD #3-#5, 
QUEUE, M; 
ASSIGN:Timein=TNOW;      [Mark beginning of flowtime] 
SEIZE: ForkTrk(M);              [Utilization of Hold3x Flift] 
DELAYED(GroupQty);        [Time to load Lift3] 
RELEASE:ForkTrk(M):NEXT(send); [Send LiftS to main deck] 
STATION, MdatL3;              [Main deck L3 unloading routine] 






splits SEQ SPLIT:M;                      [for multi pallet loads only] 
unloads QUEUE,unload3Ql; 
SEIZE: Equip3;                       [Temp asset to control flow] 
DELAY:ED(4+GroupQty-TestQty3)*.4; [Time to pull Pallet from L3] 
QUEUE,L3StageQl; 
SEIZE :L3 Staging; 
DELAY:ED(4+GroupQty-TestQty3)*.2; [Time in control of stage area] 
RELEASEE3 Staging; 





LetGoLS FREE:Lift3;                [Lift free to move since empty] 
RELEASE:ForkTrkL3; 
Moveon3 RELEASE :Equip3; 
COUNT:Hold3_Count;          Pallet count out of hold3 
ASSIGN: NS=9:                     !Reset all NS for 2nd transporter 
IS=1; 
ROUTE: 0,L3 Stage; 
STATION, L3 Stage; 









IF,M.eq. 11 .and.LT(FtruckMD3,FTruck#).eq. 11 ,Load3: 











































Contol Trk for unloading] 
splitSEQ4 
unload4 
SPLIT:M: [for multi pallet loads only] 
QUEUE,unload4Ql; 
SEIZE: Equip4; [Temp asset to control flow] 
DELAY:ED(4+GroupQty-TestQty4)*.4; [Time to pull Pallet from L3] 
QUEUE,L4StageQl; 
SEIZE:L4Staging; 
DELAY:ED(4+GroupQty-TestQty4)* .2;   [Time in control of stage area] 
RELEASE :L4Staging; 











COUNT:Hold4_Count; Pallet count out of hold3 




QUEUE, ForkTrkAft4Q;        Q for delivery to RASsta 
ALLOCATE: FTruckMD4(SDS,FTruck#); 
BRANCH, 1: 
IF,M.eq. 12.and.LT(FtruckMD4,FTruck#).eq. 12,Load4: 













AS SIGN:MDFTSpeed=ED( 10); 
MOVE:FtruckMD4(FTnack#),AftlLane,MDFTSpeed; 
QUEUE, Aisle4Ql; 

























DELAY: ED(11); Time to unload at AftCargo 
FREE: FtruckMD3(FTruck#); Free Flift for next pallet 
ROUTE: 0,Aftcargo; 
STATION, FreeTrk4; 
DELAY: ED(1 l);Time to unload at AftCargo 






















Delay to load, move to FDeck, unload 
Helos arrive to pick up pallets 
B. EXPERIMENT CODE 
BEGIN; 
Project, USNS SAN JOSE UNREP, K. J. Grosskopf,  1995; 
ATTRIBUTES: Timein: 
Origin: 'Defines hold/level origin 
GroupQty: ! Defines Nr pallets on Lift 
Truck#; 'Used to assign Ftrk 




! Counts # pallets out of hold 3 
!4 





ILoad 1 pallet on L3 
ILoad 2 pallets on L3 
ILoad 3 pallets on L3 











IRemove 2nd pallet from L3 
IRemove 3rd pallet from L3 
!Trk speed L3 to FwdlLane 
!Trk speed L4 to FwdlLane 
!Trk speed Narrow Aisle 
!Trk Speed in After cargo 
!Time to unload at AftCargo 




























































!Lift cap 1 pallet each hold3 
! Artificial delays for flow reasons 
! Flight Deck Elevator 






















; list pallets pre-stagged pallets in priority sequence, use a 
; seperate line for 3 pallet lifts and 1 or 2 pallet lifts) 
!, LVF(pri): 
'Waiting for Aisle going Fwd (empty) 
! Waiting for Aisle going Aft (Full) 
(Waiting for Aisle going Fwd (empty) 
! Waiting for Aisle going Aft (Full) 
!L3Ftrk waiting for L3 stage area 
IFTruckMD waiting for L# stage area 
Waiting for L# Ftrk 
Waiting for L# Ftrk 
52 
qty     origin GpQty Truck# 
ARRIVALS:  l,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 6,A(1)= .0,A(2)=   1,A(3)=    3 ,A(4)=     0: ! create 
entity 
2,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 3,A(1)= .0,A(2)=   4,A(3)=    3,A(4)= 0 
3,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 9,A(1)= .0,A(2)=   2,A(3)=    3,A(4)= 0 
4,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 9,A(1)= .0,A(2)=   3,A(3)=    3,A(4)= 0 
5,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 1,A(1)= .0,A(2)=   3,A(3)=    1,A(4)= 0 
6,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 12,A(1)= .0,A(2)=   5,A(3)=    3,A(4)= 0: ! create entity 
7,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 15,A(1)= .0,A(2)=   6,A(3)=    3,A(4)= 0: 
8,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 9,A(1)= 0,A(2)=   7,A(3)=    3,A(4)= 0: 
9,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 1,A(1)= ,0,A(2)=   7,A(3)=    1,A(4)= 0: 
10,BLOCK(Startup),0.0, 3,A(1)= .0,A(2)=   8,A(3)=    3,A(4)= 0; 










TALLIES:                   1, FWDwait,"fwd.sim": 
2, T_Time; 
OUTPUTS:                TMAX(T Time),"time.sim",UNREP TIME: 
DAVG(16),"UTEL.SIM",MDFTUTIL: 
DAVG(2), "back.sim",BACKLOG AT ELEVATOR #3; 
TRANSPORTERS: l,Lift3,1,1,100,9: lElevator from Hold3X to Deck (EL3) 
2,Lift4,1,1,100,10: lElevator from Hold4X to Deck (EL4) 
3,FTruckMD3,1,2,5,11: IFlifts from L3Stage to Aft Cargo 





Establishes Nr of pallets on L3 
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DSTATS: NQ(ForkTrkAft3Q),Nr. waiting MDL3 Ftrks,"MDFT3.sim" 
NQ(ForkTrkAft4Q),Nr. waiting MDL4 Ftrks,"MDFT4.sim" 
NQ(AftCargoQ), Nr. staged at RASstalO: 
NQ(Aisle3Ql), Waiting Aisle going Fwd: 
NQ(Aisle3Q3),Waiting Aisle going Aft: 
NQ(L3StageQl),L3Trk wait for L3Stage: 
NQ(L3StageQ2),MDFtrk wait for L3Stage: 
NR(l)*100,UtilofFtruck31: 






NR(8)*100,UtiI of Ftruck44: 
NR(ForkTrkL3)*100,Util of FtruckEB: 
NR(ForkTrkL4)*100,Util ofFtruckEW: 
NT(Lift3)*100, Busy Elev 3: 
NT(FtruckMD3)*100,Busy Forktrkl3: 
NT(FtruckMD4)* 100,Busy Forktrkl4: 
NQ(FDEQ),Pallets on FD: 










SAMPLE OUTPUT DATA 
SIMAN V - License #9999999 
Systems Modeling Corporation 
Summary for Replication 1 of 1 
Project: USS SAN JOSE UNREP 
Analyst: K. J. Grosskopf, 1995 
Replication ended at time:   100.439 
Run execution date : 10/22/1995 
Model revision date:  10/22/1995 
Identifier Average 
TALLY VARIABLES 




34.707 .65031 3.4552 100.43 108 
DISCRETE-CHANGE VARIABLES 
Average Variation Minimum Maximum Final Value 
NW MDL3 Ftrks 8.5289 .61567 .00000 18.000 .00000 
NW MDL4 Ftrks .10666 2.8939 .00000 1.0000 .00000 
NratRASstalO .00000 ~ .00000 .00000 .00000 
W Aisle Fwd .00745 11.544 .00000 1.0000 .00000 
W Aisle Aft .01906 7.1732 .00000 1.0000 .00000 
L3TrkL3 Stage .01045 9.7295 .00000 1.0000 .00000 
MDFtrkL3Stag .00000 — .00000 .00000 .00000 
UtilofFtruck31 2.4658 6.2892 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Util of Ftruck32 3.4461 5.2931 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Util of Ftruck33 5.2553 4.2459 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Util of Ftruck34 1.2385 8.9296 .00000 100.00 .00000 
UtilofFtruck41 4.3327 4.6989 .00000 100.00 .00000 
UtilofFtruck42 7.6895 3.4647 .00000 100.00 .00000 
UtilofFtruck43 4.4497 4.6339 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Util of Ftruck44 1.1309 9.3501 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Util of FtruckE13 15.097 2.3714 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Util of FtruckE14 24.127 1.7733 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Busy Elev 3 35.947 1.3348 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Busy Forktrkl3 98.082 .13983 .00000 100.00 .00000 
Busy ForktrkW 85.348 1.0291 .00000 200.00 .00000 
Pallets on FD 26.251 .46970 .00000 38.000 34.000 





















BACKLOG AT ELEVATOR #3      .10666 
Execution time: 0.03 minutes. 
Simulation run complete. 
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APPENDIX D. CASREP COUNTS FOR AFS/TAFS 
Casualty Report Category 
Year Hull 2 




































Casualty Report Cate gory 
Year    Hull 2 3 4 
1990    AFS-1 6 2 0 
AFS-3 61 13 2 
AFS-5 32 8 0 
AFS-6 46 6 2 
AFS-7 109 11 5 
TAFS-8 33 0 2 
TAFS-9 29 3 8 
TAFS-10 45 4 2 
















1991    AFS-1 9 1 0 10 
AFS-3 34 5 0 39 
AFS-5 25 2 1 28 
AFS-6 26 3 0 29 
AFS-7 52 4 2 58 
TAFS-8 42 1 0 43 
TAFS-9 44 1 5 50 
TAFS-10 38 0 0 38 
Total for 1991: 270 17 8 295 





1992    AFS-1 34 9 1 44 
AFS-3 64 9 3 76 
AFS-5 25 2 3 30 
AFS-6 29 4 3 36 
AFS-7 52 6 2 60 
TAFS-5 0 1 0 1 
TAFS-7 1 0 0 1 
TAFS-8 13 0 1 14 
TAFS-9 43 0 1 44 
TAFS-10 14 1 0 15 
Total for 1992: 275 32 14 321 
Note: AFS-5/7 were transferred to MSC during CY 1992 
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1993    AFS-3 75 18 1 94 
AFS-6 14 1 4 19 
AFS-7 12 4 0 16 
TAFS-1 17 2 1 20 
TAFS-5 99 2 2 103 
TAFS-7 2 0 0 2 
TAFS-8 18 1 1 20 
TAFS-9 33 0 1 34 
TAFS-10 32 1 1 34 
Total for 1993: 302 29 11 342 
Year    Hull 2 
Casualty Report Category 
3                      4 Total 
1994    AFS-3 38 7 6 51 
TAFS-1 33 1 1 35 
TAFS-5 83 1 1 85 
TAFS-6 35 5 0 40 
TAFS-8 17 0 0 17 
TAFS-9 13 4 2 19 
TAFS-10 8 2 0 10 
Total for 1994: 227 20 10 257 
Note: TAFS-7, USNS SAN JOSE undergoing conversion, no reports submitted 
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Totals for 1995: 14 
















8 7 159 
Note: AFS-3 decommissioned during CY 1994 
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APPENDIX E. FLIGHT DECK ADDITION DATA 
UNREPTIME MAIN DECK UTILIZATION BACKLOG AT #3 
97.787 15.097 0.10666 
99.976 14.162 0.14427 
100.36 14.685 0.11500 
100.03 13.972 0.13276 
98.447 13.984 0.12966 
100.03 14.800 0.12421 
100.72 14.732 0.10624 
98.072 15.158 0.12727 
98.894 14.641 0.10536 
97.886 14.191 0.12757 
96.354 14.218 0.13815 
99.143 14.453 0.14147 
98.848 15.479 0.12352 
98.610 14.564 0.13684 
99.293 14.552 0.11279 
99.004 14.866 0.13458 
98.847 14.203 0.11405 
98.353 14.327 0.20427 
98.498 14.568 0.11907 
98.976 14.880 0.12891 
98.766 15.054 0.24668 
101.11 14.637 0.12646 
98.955 15.236 0.10922 
100.13 14.727 0.11269 
97.779 14.434 0.11505 
97.94 15.015 0.11660 
100.05 14.704 0.15282 
97.952 15.006 0.11631 
97.915 14.935 0.13028 
99.48 14.240 0.09858 
98.596 14.785 0.11486 
96.394 15.568 0.12861 
97.459 14.599 0.13801 
98.552 15.137 0.10504 
98.046 14.755 0.13374 
98.186 14.712 0.11201 
98.88 14.892 0.14748 
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UNREPTIME MAIN DECK UTILIZATION BACKLOG AT #3 
100.58 14.499 0.12240 
98.873 14.845 0.13137 
98.391 15.252 0.15829 
101.538 14.578 0.10167 
99.038 14.186 0.13777 
98.694 14.649 0.11723 
98.575 14.798 0.16334 
101.07 14.808 0.14079 
99.14 14.764 0.15750 
98.256 14.525 0.13206 
99.611 14.570 0.14799 
95.88 14.892 0.11663 
100.58 14.499 0.14748 
98.873 14.845 0.12240 
98.392 15.252 0.13137 
105.538 14.578 0.15829 
99.038 14.186 0.10167 
98.694 14.649 1.37770 
98.575 14.798 0.11723 
101.07 14.808 0.16334 
99.14 14.764 0.14079 
98.256 14.525 0.15750 
99.611 14.570 0.13206 
:    99.029 14.697 0.152566 
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